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Performance and the law is not a small topic. Indeed, it is not a topic within the law at all. 
Rather, performance is a characterization of the whole of law. There is not more or less of it in 
certain areas of the law. There is nothing but performance, extending from judges, to parties, to 
ordinary citizens. Yet, while comprehensive, the idea of legal performance is not so broad as to 
be analytically unhelpful. It would be if there were only one way to understand the political 
order. But, in fact, law works on a highly contested symbolic field. The performativity of law is 
best understood as securing and stabilizing a position on this field. 
To understand the rule of law, one must look to the competing understandings of self and polity 
actually in play for the citizens of a modern, democratic nation-state. (Variations across nations 
and groups are to be expected, and my examples come from the United States in particular.) 
There is nothing theoretical about the rule of law; it is, rather, a configuration of the imagination. 
As such, it is bound to historical contexts. Today, the rule of law must shape the imagination of 
citizens who maintain a myth of their own revolutionary origin, live in a world of multiple 
sovereign states, and confront the emerging pressures of globalization. These citizens imagine 
themselves in multiple relationships to the polity: private persons using law and politics to 
advance their own ends, rights-bearing subjects under legitimate law, and members of the 
popular sovereign. 
As private persons, citizens have a conception of the self prior to law; as members of the 
sovereign, they intuit a politics of exception—of revolution and war—beyond the ordering 
capacity of law. The strains on the legal imagination come from both directions—markets and 
war. Law is tested, and the legal imagination is successful, when these dimensions, too, are 
perceived from within the rule of law. American legal and political theory is constantly confused 
over the relationships among these conflicting imaginaries of markets, law, and war—or market 
participants, rights bearers, and combatants. There is no ordered relationship to be found, only a 
constant competition fought out in the imagination. 
The modern legal imagination brings two critical resources to this competition. First, law holds 
itself out as the product of the sovereign will. This belief is as old as the West. In its modern 
form, the people are the sovereign, and law expresses the will of the people. Second, law is the 
product of reason—an idea of Enlightenment origins. Accordingly, the rule of law is 
simultaneously the working out of reason in history and the working out of the truth of the 
people. The legal imagination works simultaneously in the dimensions of reason and will—
ultimately, of truth and revelation. We cannot answer whether the legitimacy of law comes from 
a science of law or from the people's self-revelation. We cannot decide whether we are liberals or 
republicans. Indeed, the very distinction comes from the theorist's narrowing of the imaginative 
sources of law. 
Many of our obvious legal rituals are enactments of this intersection of public reason and the 
democratic will. Consider the foundational enactment of a constitution. Americans may know 
that the creation of the Constitution required compromise across factional lines, yet they believe 
that constitutional government cannot be other than the rule of reason. When the Constitution 
seems to require irrational action, we confront a constitutional crisis, which must be resolved in 
favor of reason. (Slavery and the Civil War are the paradigm case of the inevitable movement 
toward reason). Simultaneously, the Constitution is understood as binding us, rather than some 
other group, because it expresses the will of the popular sovereign. Constitutional adjudication—
and all political issues can rapidly become constitutional issues—is a rhetorical performance that 
cuts across the categories of reason and will. The court is simultaneously the forum of reason and 
the arbiter of history. Arguing before the court, one can equally appeal to John Rawls and to 
James Madison. Viewed abstractly, the court is not likely to be judged good at political theory or 
legal history, but it is wrong to ask of it such excellences. Its excellence, rather, lies in the 
domain of rhetorical performance. It succeeds when it maintains the belief in the rule of law. 
Of course, we know that the Constitution was produced by a political process that excluded more 
Americans than it included, just as we know that reason is not independent of history and place. 
Indeed, much of our ordinary political process amounts to a contest among factions with 
competing understandings of the truth. The task of law's rule, however, is to displace all of this 
from our vision: in the Constitution we see only the sovereign people speaking in the voice of 
reason. So much is this so, that what might otherwise appear as political fact cannot even be said 
before a court. One cannot describe a law as the product of a powerful faction. Rather, law is 
always the popularly willed expression of a public policy that brings reason to bear on an issue 
of common governance. Similarly, one cannot dismiss a precedent as the idiosyncratic 
expression of the Justices' particular interests. Law succeeds when such private interests are 
literally no longer cognizable. 
Constitution-making and litigation are important sites for the construction and maintenance of 
the legal imaginary. So, too, is the judicial confirmation process. Again, the order of law comes 
into contact with a popular politics of competing interest groups. We witness a rite of 
transformation by which a nominee chosen for purely factional reasons becomes a 
personification of the law. The nominee emerges stripped of his personal character and private 
interests. We all have a tremendous investment in this transformation because if we continue to 
see the judge as a political partisan, if we see the reasons for his selection by a particular 
president at a particular moment, we will collapse law into the ordinary politics of factions. Law 
will become an adjunct of markets: an alternative means of advancing private interests. 
For Americans, the oath no longer accomplishes this transformation; rather, the performance at 
the confirmation hearing does so. (Nations without such a rite of transformation, I suspect, find 
their courts suffering an incurable democracy deficit.) Central to the hearing is a ritual of 
confession: an emptying of the soul of the private self and an opening up to that grace which 
flows from the sovereign people through the Constitution. The hearing is not about the exchange 
of views; it is not about an inquiry into legal ability. Rather, the nominee goes before the nation 
and swears to abandon her former self, her former beliefs, her former political connections and 
professional relations. She tells us that she will decide each case, looking only to the law. She 
will look neither backward to the personalities and connection of the parties before the court, nor 
forward to the factional implications of a decision. She will open herself only to the presence of 
the law. At this point, we are regularly retold stories of the transformative power of the law, of 
how a Justice appointed with the expectations that he would carry out a particular political 
agenda becomes a "changed person" once he is on the bench. These are the saints of the law. 
Of course, no one fully believes that the judge is born again, just as no one really believes that 
law is reason without interest. But everyone sort of believes. We believe it as a background 
assumption that sustains the rule of law. The suppression of the individual subjectivity of the 
judge is central to the judicial performance: the court, not the judge, speaks; the decision is 
always spoken in the name of the law, which appears to us as the will of the sovereign people. At 
the end of the confirmation process we are to see only the robes, not the particular person who 
bears the robes. Stripped of his particular personhood, the judge represents us by acting out who 
we are in our political being. Living in the law, we, too, are to overcome our own private nature 
through participation in the popular sovereign. 
So far, I have spoken of the competition between a private and a public conception of the self 
that is at stake in the performance of law. The judge models an idea of citizenship as sacrifice: he 
gives himself over completely to the presence of the popular sovereign through law. Lincoln 
already saw that reverence for law is a sacrificial religion in the United States. He also saw that 
the sacrifice for law stands in an uneasy relationship to sacrifice on the field of battle. The 
soldier, he told us at Gettysburg, sacrifices for a nation dedicated to a proposition: just the model 
of will and reason that defines the rule of law. 
As soon as law claims the power of sovereignty, it claims the power over life itself. This theme is 
as old as the sacrifice of Isaac: the sovereign power to pronounce the law is the power of life and 
death. Contemporary objections to the death penalty may obscure this connection, but they do 
not undermine it. In America, at least, this is a debate about the just administration—or even the 
morality—of death as a criminal penalty. This debate has little bearing on the sovereign's claim 
on the citizen's life. This was palpably evident during the Cold War, when entire nations were 
targeted for nuclear destruction. The "post-sovereignty" era of globalization lasted from the fall 
the Soviet Union to the fall of the World Trade Towers. Today, the threat to life that arises from 
political identity is again self-evident. The contemporary discourse of war—a "war on terror"—
reminds us that we can be asked to kill and to be killed for the state. 
The history of the modern nation-state combines a narrative of law's rule and a narrative of 
killing and being killed. The former we ordinarily think of as a narrative of life, and the latter of 
death. These are the two faces of popular sovereignty. In truth, however, both are narratives of 
sacrifice—of life achieved through death. Nevertheless, what is largely metaphoric in law—for 
example, the ritualized sacrifice of the citizen become judge—is very real in war. The point at 
which the state demands a real, and not a metaphoric, act of sacrifice is always politically 
dangerous. For here, a failed sacrifice can appear as an act of murder. 
There is always a risk that the modern nation-state's pursuit of sacrifice will be re-imagined as 
mere death and torture. This has happened repeatedly in modern history—from the Russian front 
in the First World War to the Vietnam War. It threatens today with respect to the Iraq war, as 
families question whether the sacrifice of their children is an affirmation of the life of the popular 
sovereign or a senseless murder. (The same phenomenon can occur internally: for example, as 
the confirmation hearing of Justice Thomas threatened to fail, he accused his opponents of 
engaging in a "high-tech lynching," reminding everyone that, to the black man, Jim Crow laws 
appeared as an instrumentality of death and torture.) 
The performance of law acts on this contested field of sovereignty, sacrifice, and violence. The 
legal performance is critical for the normalization of sacrifice. We are to imagine that what is at 
stake in the deployment of violence is the state as the order of law: Lincoln's message. We are 
not to see the terror and tortured destruction of the battlefield. Rather, we are to imagine sacrifice 
for the sake of democracy and rights—the norms of the legal order. The soldier becomes an 
extension of the judge—and, as such, of everyman—giving himself to the maintenance of the 
rule of law as the will of the sovereign. In American life, this role was literally personified in 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who was soldier and judge for what was then close to half of our 
national existence. 
The legal imagination is a hegemonic force within the state, seeking to extend its conceptual 
order across the whole domain of the political. At stake in the legal performance is whether we 
will see the sacrifice of the revolutionary founder, the sacrifice of the judge, and the sacrifice of 
the combatant as one continuous expression of popular sovereignty. Much of what has been the 
unending American legal crisis since September 11 has been the consequence of this relentless 
effort at the juridification of sovereign violence: Does the legal regime extend to Guantanamo? 
Can the president legally engage in warrantless surveillance? Is there a category of unlawful 
combatants who are outside of the protection of law? 
The list of sites of contestation is quite endless, but all question whether there are any limits on 
the reach of law within the modern state. One way or another, law must win every one of these 
confrontations. If it fails, if the sovereign does appear stripped of law, then we are in the crisis of 
the exception. As with the violence at Abu Ghraib, law will make every effort swiftly to recover 
its hegemonic position. We are witnessing today the inevitable movement of questions of life 
and death into an adjudicative form. The social imaginary of law cannot withstand even a little 
bit of lawlessness. The voice of the Supreme Court is to be final. Not only does the Court 
regularly claim this for itself, but it is almost impossible for us to imagine disagreement with this 
proposition. 
At stake in the judicial performance is the character of the sovereign that demands sacrifice: the 
judge models sacrifice for the sovereign by taking onto himself the burden of killing and being 
killed for the state. That performance succeeds when we see law—and only law—in every 
direction: at the beginning, in the center, and at the periphery. Beyond the law are only torture 
and terror—attributes of violence we assign to the enemy. If law fails, we might turn on the state 
as immoral in its destruction of self and others. Alternatively, we might adopt a narrative of 
popular sovereignty unleashed from law. This would be a political narrative of revolutionary 
violence without constitutional form. Violence would be an expression of pure power. Creation 
and destruction would then be one and the same. We need not turn to the French Revolution to 
imagine this, for in our nuclear weapons we possess far more than a mere image of the sovereign 
as pure destruction. These weapons express the capacity of the sovereign to break free of law. In 
this contest of law to shape the social imagination, then, rests the very fate of the earth. 
 
